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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Teaching hospitals face unprecedented challenges that necessitate 
changes to how America finances the residency requirements of physicians’ 
education and training. Predicted physician shortages,1 new health care 
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1 See Graduate Medical Education: Training Tomorrow’s Physician Workforce, 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC), https://www.aamc.org/download
/386374/data/07252014.pdf (predicting the nation will be short 130,600 physicians by 2025). 
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payment reforms,2 and demands for greater price transparency3 all highlight 
the need for revisions to current graduate medical education financing 
structures. 
For years, hospitals have delivered hands-on training experiences for 
physicians and an array of other caregivers during their journey from 
students to fully licensed practitioners.4 Teaching hospitals incur substantial 
costs to provide these residency or clinical experiences and have relied on a 
complex and fragmented financing structure to balance those costs. 5 This 
multi-faceted, indirect and complex cost recovery system worked marginally 
well while teaching hospitals were paid predominantly on a fee-for-service 
basis for the patient care they provided, and when individual customers had 
little incentive to compare providers based on costs. Those conditions, 
however, are eroding quickly. 
After summarizing existing financing systems underlying physician 
residency programs, this article explains the mounting pressures that 
jeopardize the sustainability of physician residency programs as payment 
reforms and price transparency initiatives move forward. To ensure ongoing, 
high quality physician training programs, we propose employing new 
mechanisms for ensuring that teaching hospitals can be competitive under 
new payment reforms without diminishing their commitment to medical 
education. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
How society finances graduate medical education, especially for 
physicians, is a rising public policy concern as multiple and sometimes 
conflicting demands collide in the arena of public debate. It is important to 
recognize a few underlying realities of educating and training physicians that 
confine the options available to solve the policy challenges which are 
discussed later in this article. 
First, before entering the health care workforce as fully licensed 
practitioners, physicians need practical, hands-on, and supervised training, 
commonly referred to as a residency.6 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Fact Sheets: Better Care. Smarter Spending. Healthier People: 
Paying Providers for Value, Not Volume, CRS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.(Jan. 26, 
2015), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-
items/2015-01-26-3.html. 
3 See, e.g., Russ Mitchell, Employers, Unions Jointly Demand Health Care Price 
Transparency, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/
employers-unions-jointly-demand-health-care-price-transparency/. 
4 See Graduate Medical Education, supra note 1. 
5 See id. (estimating teaching hospitals’ direct costs of medical education 
programs to be $16.2 billion each year). 
6 See Catherine Dower, Health Policy Brief: Graduate Medical Education, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1 (Aug. 16, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs
/healthpolicybrief_73.pdf. After medical school, physicians complete their training as 
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Second, while a physician completes his/her residency, the teaching 
institution, which is most typically a hospital, incurs direct and indirect 
expenses and inefficiencies.7 
Third, during their residency and hands-on training, physicians 
perform services for patients and, in so doing, constitute a “key part of the 
labor supply at these hospitals.”8 However, “[t]hese residents do not, overall, 
generate revenue” for a teaching hospital. 
Given these underlying realities, the net result is that teaching 
hospitals bear financial costs that other “non-teaching” hospitals do not 
shoulder. The policy issue at hand, therefore, is how society should finance 
those additional costs incurred by teaching hospitals in order to maintain 
their residency programs. 
The current approach commonly used by Medicare and some states’ 
Medicaid programs—often teaching hospitals’ two most significant and 
influential payers—is an attempt to upwardly adjust their traditional fee-for-
service payment amounts for services provided to their enrollees to recognize 
and partially mitigate these hospitals’ education and training costs. These 
public payers make supplemental payments up to and above the standard 
rates for hospital services when those services are delivered to a Medicare or 
Medicaid beneficiary by a teaching hospital. 
In other words, if a non-teaching hospital’s Medicare payment for a 
particular service was $X, then a teaching hospital’s Medicare payment for 
the same service would be $X + (supplemental payment $Y). Thus, two 
hospitals in the same community may receive different payment amounts 
from the same public program for the same service if one hospital is a 
teaching hospital and the other is not. 
In an attempt to recognize two different categories of costs teaching 
hospitals incur, Medicare makes two different supplemental payments to 
teaching hospitals. 
A teaching hospital’s direct costs, such as spending on physician 
faculty members’ and residents’ salaries and benefits, a portion of a teaching 
hospital’s overhead, and the administrative staff needed to manage the 
programs, are referred to as direct graduate medical education (direct GME 
or DGME).9 Congress enacted a GME supplemental payment in an attempt 
to recognize and pay for some of these costs in amendments to the Social 
Security Act through the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(COBRA) of 1985.10 This statute, along with its corresponding regulations,11 
                                                                                                                   
residents. This training usually occurs in hospitals over the course of four years, or longer for 
highly specialized fields. Id. 
7 See, e.g., THE LEWIN GROUP, An Assessment of Hospital Medicaid and 
Medicare Payments in Minnesota, at slides 15–16, 18 (Mar. 2004). 
8 Id. 
9 See What does Medicare have to do with Graduate Medical Education?, 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES 1, https://www.aamc.org/download/253380/
data/medicare-gme.pdf. 
10 See Pub. L. 99-272 § 9202 (1985) amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2015). 
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establish a complex methodology for determining each teaching hospital’s 
base period per-resident cost amount (PRA) by dividing the hospital’s 
allowable operating costs in its base year by the number of residents in 
training at the hospital during that base year.12 For most hospitals, federal 
fiscal year 1984 serves as their base year.13 
Medicare uses this PRA ratio from the base year and multiplies it 
with the number of full-time-equivalent residencies provided by a teaching 
hospital in a given year, and then applies that amount to Medicare’s 
proportional number of inpatients served by the hospital.14 The formula used 
by Medicare takes into account several variables including but not limited to 
the unique needs of psychiatric hospitals.15 
The GME program and methodology for calculating supplemental 
payments to teaching hospitals are not designed or intended to cover all of 
those hospital’s expenses resulting from training and educating physicians. 
According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), the 
average direct graduate medical education costs incurred by a teaching 
hospital for training a single physician resident amount to approximately 
$100,000 per year.16 Medicare’s direct graduate medical education 
supplemental payments for the average teaching hospital, however, account 
for only $25,000 of the hospital’s estimated $100,000 of costs.17 
Since enactment of COBRA, the GME program has been impacted 
by other major pieces of federal legislation. Most significantly, the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 1996 imposed a cap on the number of physician 
residencies teaching hospitals could count when calculating the amount of 
GME supplemental payments Medicare pays.18 Consequently, many teaching 
hospitals that train more physicians than the number allowed to be counted 
for determining GME payments have artificial limits on the amount of 
supplemental funding from Medicare to support their education and training 
programs. These caps remain in place and unchanged since 1996. 
                                                                                                                   
11 42 C.F.R. § 413.75–83 (2015). 
12 See Direct Graduate Medical Education (DGME), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/Acute
InpatientPPS/dgme.html. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww 
(2015). 
15 See id. § 1395ww(a)(2)(B). 
16 Id. See also Joanne Conroy, The Graduate Medical Education Debate, 
HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/22/the-
graduate-medical-education-debate/ (estimating training cost per physician at $75,000 to 
$100,000). 
17 See Colin P. West, Quality of Life, Burnout, Educational Debt, and Medical 
Knowledge among Internal Medicine Residents, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS. 9 952, 952 (2011); see 
also Joanne Conroy, The Graduate Medical Education Debate, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 
22, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/02/22/the-graduate-medical-education-debate/ 
(estimating training cost per physician at $75,000 to $100,000). 
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(4)(B)(vi)(I). 
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Although the total number of GME-supported residencies remains 
unchanged, the Affordable Care Act authorized Medicare to reallocate some 
of the residencies. If a hospital had not used all of its available GME-
supported residencies slots for the past three years, Medicare could reallocate 
65% of those slots to other hospitals.19 As a result, 726 GME-supported 
residency slots were shifted from 267 hospitals to 58 other hospitals. 
The Affordable Care Act also authorized Medicare to redistribute 
GME-supported residency slots from any hospital that closed, including slots 
from hospitals that closed on or after March 23, 2008.20 
The teaching hospitals eligible to receive additional residency slots 
through this redistribution had to be located in a state in the lowest quartile 
of states based on the number of residents-to-population, or in rural or health 
professional shortage areas, and no single teaching hospital could receive 
more than 75 reallocated residencies.21 
In addition to direct GME costs, teaching hospitals shoulder indirect 
costs that accompany hosting a physician residency program (indirect GME 
or IME) costs.22 Because teaching hospitals need to recruit and retain the 
faculty, facilities and expertise necessary to train tomorrow’s workforce, they 
attract patients with more acute and complex conditions, offer a wider array 
of medical services and typically engage in research related activities.23 As a 
result, teaching hospitals’ operational costs are higher than those incurred by 
similar organizations without teaching programs.24 
Attempts to document and measure these indirect costs, however, 
have not produced consensus regarding the financial consequences of IME. 
According to one study, a teaching hospital’s average cost per Medicare 
patient was as much as 28% higher than a nonteaching hospital’s.25 Another 
study estimated that IME costs could cause a teaching hospital’s costs to be 
                                                 
19 Id.§ 1395ww. 
20 Id. § 1395ww(h)(4)(H). 
21 As calculated by Medicare, only hospitals in the following states could meet 
these eligibility criteria: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto 
Rico, South Dakota, Wyoming. See, Redistribution of Graduate Medicare Slots, AM. COLL. OF 
PHYSICIANS (2013), http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where_we_stand/assets/iii4-redistri
bution-graduate-medica-education-slots.pdf. 
22 Despite the language centered on “medical education,” IME payments are more 
directly related to case and service mix costs that are associated with medical education 
programs than to the expenses of the actual medical education activities. See Report to the 
Congress: Aligning Incentives in Medicare, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N (June 
2010), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jun10_EntireReport.pdf?sfvrsn=0. See also 
Catherine Dower, Health Policy Brief: Graduate Medical Education, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG 
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=73 
(hereinafter MPAC Report). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See Lane Koenig, et al., Estimating the Mission-Related Costs of Teaching 
Hospitals, 22 HEALTH AFF., 6 112, 113 (2003). 
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almost 40% higher than a general hospital.26 While the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has dismissed such estimates as 
significantly inflated and distorted.27 
Despite the lack of consensus on the amount of IME expenses 
teaching hospitals carry, there is agreement that hospital operational costs are 
higher if the hospital offers physician residency training. To offset a portion 
of these indirect and nebulous costs, Congress amended the Social Security 
Act to authorize Medicare to make IME supplemental payments on top of the 
standard reimbursement rates for services teaching hospitals provide to 
Medicare beneficiaries.28 Only teaching hospitals that are eligible to receive 
GME payments are eligible to receive IME payments.29 These IME 
payments cover an estimated 2.7% of hospitals’ indirect medical education 
costs.30 
As with GME, the methodology for calculating a teaching hospital’s 
IME payment is complex.31 Instead of using a hospital’s cost-to-resident 
ratio, as in the case of GME, IME payments begin with a calculation of the 
teaching hospital’s number of physician residents compared to the number of 
its inpatient beds. This ratio is then multiplied by a factor set by Congress.32 
In short, a teaching hospital’s IME payments reflect the number of residents 
it trains relative to the size of its inpatient hospital operations. 
Congress has changed the IME payment factor many times over the 
years.33 Although Medicare’s GME and IME supplemental payments do not 
                                                 
26 See A. Dobson, et al., Financial Performance of Academic Health Center 
Hospitals, 1994–2000, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 2002), http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fund-report/2002/sep/financial-
performance-of-academic-health-center-hospitals--1994-
2000/dobson_financialperformance_543-pdf.pdf (estimating that academic health centers’ 
average costs were 27–39% higher than other organizations). 
27 See MPAC Report, supra note 22 (arguing that teaching hospitals’ IME 
expenses are grossly exaggerated). 
28 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 USC § 1395ww(d)(5)(B) 
(2015). 
29 See id. 
30 See Koenig, supra note 25, at 113; see also Dower, supra note 7, at 2. But see 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ALIGNING INCENTIVES 
IN MEDICARE (June 2010) (arguing that Medicare’s $6.5 billion in IME supplemental 
payments to teaching hospitals actually exceed those hospitals’ IME expenses by $3.5 billion). 
31 See generally, 42 C.F.R. § 412.105. 
32 See id. 
33 See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (decreasing IME factor from 7.7% to 5.5% 
over four years); see also Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act 
of 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.; see also Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 
2000 (BIPA), Pub.L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.) (delaying reductions to ad revising short-term factors for IME payment methodology). 
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cover the costs of teaching hospitals’ medical education programs, Medicare 
is the single largest financier of medical education in the United States.34 
In addition to Medicare’s supplemental payments methodologies, 
many states’ Medicaid programs have adopted payment formulas designed to 
provide increased funding to teaching hospitals.35 By supporting graduate 
medical education through their Medicaid payment mechanisms, states are 
able to leverage federal matching funds.36 Therefore, between states’ 
spending through Medicaid and the accompanying federal matching funds, 
Medicaid is the second largest payer of graduate medical education costs 
nationwide.37 
Unlike the Medicare program, the federal Medicaid program 
contains surprisingly few restrictions or requirements on whether or how 
states support medical education through supplemental Medicaid payments.38 
Any such payments or support through a state’s Medicaid program to 
teaching hospitals must be contained in an approved state plan amendment. 
Although there are different approaches to the manner in which state 
Medicaid programs approach graduate medical education funding, some 
states follow Medicare’s approach and provide support for both direct and 
indirect medical education.39 For those states, as well as most that follow 
other formulas or definitions, the typical mechanism used to convey medical 
education funding in Medicaid programs is through their fee-for-service 
methodologies.40 Thus, like Medicare, most Medicaid programs’ graduate 
medical education financing comes in the form of supplemental payments or 
increased fee-for-service reimbursement rates for services provided to 
Medicaid enrollees. 
If, however, a state relies on managed care organizations (MCOs) to 
administer coverage for Medicaid enrollees, the state’s capitation rates to the 
MCOs must be adjusted to account for any medical education payments that 
                                                 
34 See Dower, supra note 6, at 1. 
35 See Tim M. Henderson, Direct and Indirect Graduate Medical Education 
Payments: A 50-State Survey, ASS. OF AM. MED. C.’S 3 (Apr. 2010), https://members.aamc.
org/eweb/upload/Medicaid%20Direct_Indirect%20GME%20Payments%20Survey%202010.
pdf (documenting 41 states and the District of Columbia (DC) financially supporting graduate 
medical education in 2009). It should be noted, however, that the number of states investing in 
graduate medical education has dropped from 47 in 2005, and nine other states considered 
proposals to drop such investments in 2009. Id. at 3. It is also important to note that state 
Medicaid payments for medical education are in addition to any financial support states 
provide to medical schools through direct appropriations. See id. at 2 (noting that states spend 
$5 billion in appropriations for medical training outside of Medicaid payments). 
36 See id. at 2, n.7. 
37 See id. 
38 See Tim M. Henderson, Medicaid Graduate Medical Education Payments: A 
50 State Survey, ASS. OF AM. MED. C.’S 5 (2013) http://dhhs.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhhs.
nv.gov/content/About/GMETF/2014/2014-05-14_Item12a_Medicaid_GME_2013_Report_
AAMC.pdf. 
39 See id. (documenting five states that pay for both direct and indirect graduate 
medical education). 
40 See id 2, 4 (documenting 40 states and Washington D.C.). 
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the MCOs are required to pay. Any capitation rate adjustments to MCOs for 
medical education must be made after the state first establishes actuarially 
sound capitation rates.41 
The federal government’s combined spending on graduate medical 
education through Medicare and states’ Medicaid programs amounted to 
$9.5 billion in 2010.42 Of that total amount, $3 billion was in the form of 
direct GME supplemental payments and $6.5 billion went for IME 
supplemental payments.43 Since then, the 2015 federal budget cut $960 
million from GME funding44 
Because Medicare and Medicaid patients rarely incur different out-
of-pocket costs based on whether they receive care at a teaching hospital or a 
general hospital, individual patients generally do not face particular 
incentives or consequences due to the fact that their hospital receives or does 
not receive supplemental medical education payments for the services the 
patients receive. As a result, these patients covered through public health 
programs have little incentive to make their care decisions based on the 
overall payment amount the hospital will receive. In such a payment 
environment, neither hospital is at a competitive disadvantage with respect to 
attracting patients insured through these public programs. 
Although less intentional and measurable, commercial payers, such 
as health plans and self-insured employers, often have financial implications 
based on whether their enrollees receive care from a teaching hospital.45 
Because none of the public sector’s supplemental payment streams fully 
cover teaching hospitals’ actual costs of providing medical education and 
training experiences, to remain financially viable teaching hospitals must 
resort to negotiating higher reimbursement rates from commercial health 
plans and third party administrators. This practice, commonly referred to as 
cost shifting, essentially transfers and spreads a portion of the teaching 
hospital’s medical education costs to the privately insured market. 
For teaching hospitals trying to cobble together sufficient revenues 
to support their residency programs, this multi-faceted, indirect and complex 
medical education cost recovery system worked marginally well. However, 
in order for it to work without putting the teaching hospitals and their higher 
cost structures at a competitive disadvantage, several key elements need to 
be in place: (1) Public and private health plans pay for hospital services on a 
fee-for-service (FFS) basis; (2) Individual patients are shielded from 
incurring any out-of-pocket cost implications from receiving care from a 
                                                 
41 See 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(5)(v). 
42 See Dower, supra note 6, at 2. 
43 Id. at 2. 
44 See Michael Sandler, Teaching Hospitals’ Residency Levels Growing Slowly, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150202
/NEWS/150139994. 
45 Stuart Guterman, Financing Teaching Hospital Missions: A Context, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (Mar. 2015), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/22/6/123.full. 
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teaching or non-teaching hospital so their decision is not influenced by the 
overall cost structure differences between teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals; and (3) Hospitals in competitive markets have little or no 
information about what other hospitals were paid for particular services. 
Each of these circumstances necessary for the current medical 
education financing system’s functionality are becoming obsolete. New 
health care payment methodologies and cost transparency initiatives are 
explicitly designed to compare and differentiate between hospitals based on 
how much they cost—or, more accurately, how much revenue they receive—
to treat patients. Under these new payment methodologies, whether they are 
bundled payments, total-cost-of-care shared savings arrangements, global 
payments, or capitation, hospitals that deliver patient care at lower costs (or 
for lower reimbursement) will receive benefits or advantages in a 
competitive market, and those that require higher revenues to deliver the 
same services or level of care will face negative financial incentives and/or 
find themselves as a competitive disadvantage. 
Therefore, in these new payment methodologies, teaching hospitals’ 
supplemental payments and higher negotiated commercial rates jeopardize 
their ability to remain competitive when they are compared to other 
hospitals. Teaching hospitals’ opportunities for earning shared savings 
bonuses under accountable care organization (ACO) or total-cost-of-care 
(TCOC) models are more limited. While both teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals strive to reduce supply chain costs, decrease their patients’ 
utilization of health care services and find greater efficiencies in their care 
delivery operations, teaching hospitals continue to carry the medical 
education portion of their overall costs and that portion is difficult to reduce 
without cutting the number of physicians being trained or eliminating the 
hospital’s residency program entirely. 
Similarly, as more individuals in the privately insured market obtain 
health coverage that features a high deductible, individuals have greater 
interest in the variation between hospital reimbursement rates. If one hospital 
has negotiated a higher reimbursement rate for a particular service from the 
individual’s health plan, to the extent that the individual will bear all or part 
of that higher cost through his/her deductible, there is a real and tangible 
incentive to select a hospital that negotiated a lower reimbursement rate. 
Again, to the extent that teaching hospitals negotiate higher payment rates 
from commercial health plans to help offset a portion of their medical 
education expenses, they become less attractive to people with high 
deductible health plans. 
Another outcome correlated with the increasing prevalence of high 
deductible health plans, is the growing efforts to make health care providers’ 
“prices,” or estimated costs of care, more transparent and publicly available. 
One driving force of these initiatives is giving individuals with high 
deductible plans more information with which to compare providers, 
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including hospitals, based on price so they may make health care decisions 
that align with their financial interests. 
Although price transparency efforts have not yet received significant 
use by individuals, they are gaining attention from self-insured employers, 
health plans, the media and other providers who are interested in learning 
about variations in health care reimbursement rates. Therefore, while price 
transparency initiatives may evolve into tools used to influence individual 
patients’ decisions, they also carry the potential to increase pricing 
competition among providers and hospitals and their private sector payers. 
Again, teaching hospitals face a competitive disadvantage to the extent that 
these transparency activities highlight the differences in reimbursement rates 
due to teaching hospitals’ need to finance medical education and residency 
programs. 
Another health care reform impacting teaching hospitals is the rise of 
health plans that offer narrow networks of providers that are considered “in 
network” for purposes of calculating the insured’s coverage and benefits. To 
attract individual consumers shopping for coverage and comparing premium 
costs through health insurance exchanges and in response to increased 
pressure from employers looking to hold down their portion of premiums 
while continuing to provide health benefits for their employees, health 
insurers are designing and marketing insurance products with narrow 
networks of providers. Recognizing the premium price sensitivity in today’s 
market, health plan companies seek to carve out higher cost hospitals and 
clinics from their networks, thereby enabling them to create strong financial 
incentives for their enrollees to receive care only from lower cost in-network 
providers. 
Insureds who receive care from an out-of-network hospital, 
therefore, often face substantially higher out-of-pocket costs. In this way, 
narrow network health plans intensify cost-sensitive decision-making that is 
similar to and compounds the incentives individuals face under high 
deductible health plans. Because of their need for higher negotiated rates to 
help offset their graduate medical education program costs, teaching 
hospitals are more susceptible to being carved out from narrow network 
health plans. 
Under these new payment methodologies, lights of transparency, and 
insurance plan designs, teaching hospitals will find themselves at an 
increasingly competitive disadvantage. Higher cost structures due to their 
residency and clinical training programs, supplemental payments 
incorporated into their care delivery reimbursements, and higher negotiated 
reimbursement rates with commercial payers leave teaching hospitals less 
competitive on total-cost-of-care measures and appearing to be more 
expensive compared to other hospitals, and more vulnerable to narrow-
network plan designs. 
Without medical education financing reform, teaching hospitals may 
face difficult choices between retaining their residency programs, which help 
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ensure that the health care system as a whole has trained physicians capable 
of delivering high quality care to an aging and increasingly diverse 
population, but becoming less competitive with other hospitals and facing the 
financial consequences that follow, or reducing or eliminating their residency 
programs in order to bring their cost structures more in line with their 
competitors. 
The complexity of the current financing system and misguided 
proposals already under discussion add to the difficulty of implementing the 
needed reforms. 
III.  POTENTIAL BUT MISGUIDED AVENUES 
Today’s policy debate on the topic of graduate medical education 
tends to center on two simplified and conflicting views. Essentially, these 
views start from placing priority on one of two values: the need to meet the 
projected demand for physicians to care for individuals or the need to cut 
government spending. Entering the discussion from either of these two 
objectives has not led to proposals for practical, needed reforms to the 
medical education financing system. 
On one hand, some policymakers point to predicted physician and 
health care workforce shortages and the increasing burdensome student debt 
carried by new physicians to support their calls for expanding public support 
of medical education. Based on these predictions of shortages and the 
financial strains already imposed on newly licensed physicians, these 
policymakers advocate for proposals such as increasing public financial 
support of scholarships, medical schools, GME or IME, loan forgiveness 
grants, etc. These proposed policy mechanisms are designed to address or 
mitigate particular financial challenges associated with medical education 
and training costs, and to create new or increased financial incentives to 
encourage the following stakeholders to make the following decisions:  
 
(1) College graduates to enter and complete medical school;  
(2) Medical schools and hospitals to offer educational and 
training opportunities necessary for those medical students to 
complete their education and training necessary to meet 
accreditation and licensing criteria, and;  
(3) Hospitals and clinics to recruit, hire and retain new 
physicians, especially those who agree to provide care in 
underserved communities, such as rural areas, or in 
particular specialties perceived to have a shortage of medical 
professionals, such as in the areas of primary care or 
psychiatry. 
 
Proponents of these recommendations are able to enter these ideas 
into the policy debate because each of these recommendations has merit from 
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a health care workforce development perspective. However, they do not offer 
changes to the financial distribution methodology that are necessary for 
teaching hospitals to provide residency programs and compete on cost 
measures with non-teaching hospitals simultaneously. 
Also, proposed incentives for college graduates to attend medical 
school and for new physicians to practice in certain geographic areas or 
specialties in return for loan forgiveness fail to address how to fund the 
teaching hospitals’ residency programs that medical students will one day 
need before any of them are available to help fill gaps in access to care. 
Instead, the only aspect of this set of “increased funding” proposals 
designed to support physician residency programs is a straightforward 
increase in funding, presumably through the existing supplemental payment 
methodology that leaves teaching hospitals vulnerable to the downside 
consequences of payment reforms and transparency initiatives. 
On the other hand, state and federal budget deficits and increased 
concern over the rate of health care cost growth lead some policymakers to 
target the government’s spending on graduate medical education for cuts. 
The total amount of federal spending on GME—almost $10 billion—
combined with MedPAC’s claims that estimates of teaching hospitals’ 
medical education costs are overstate, have been used to support proposals to 
reduce support for GME payments.46 
In addition to MedPAC itself, the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform47 recommended cutting federal GME and IME 
spending by $6 billion.48 Under this proposal, direct GME spending would 
be capped at 120% of the average resident’s salary with future adjustments 
tied to the rate of inflation.49 The Commission relied on MedPAC’s 
characterization of medical education costs to suggest reducing IME funding 
to reflect actual costs more accurately.50 
President Obama’s proposed budgets have suggested cuts to IME 
funding. Although he did not embrace capping direct GME payments as 
proposed by the Commission, he has proposed cutting GME funding for 
children’s hospitals by 50%, and his most recent budget proposal includes 
$16.3 billion of IME cuts over ten years.51 
                                                 
46 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND 
REVENUE OPTIONS 43 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/03-10-reducingthed
eficit.pdf. 
47 Also referred to as the Simpson-Bowles Commission. 
48 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF 
TRUTH 38, (Dec. 2010), https://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files
/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Bob Herman, Obama’s 2016 Budget Cuts Medicare but Eliminates 
Sequestration, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 2, 2015) http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
article/20150202/NEWS/302029967/obamas-2016-budget-cuts-medicare-but-eliminates-
sequestration. 
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These proposals are politically palatable on both sides of the partisan 
aisle because they promise to decrease health care related expenditures 
without directly cutting patient care or individual providers’ income. Calls to 
hold graduate medical education at current levels or impose cuts seem more 
likely to be implemented than proposals to increase funding. 
At the same time, the policymakers proposing cuts to graduate 
medical education spending are not suggesting that medical schools or 
teaching hospitals reduce the number of physicians being educated and 
trained.52 
Thus, assuming there is general political consensus that the number 
of physicians needed to provide sufficient access to care is expected to 
remain equal to or greater than current levels, and assuming the amount of 
public financial support for graduate medical education will remain static or 
decrease, on whom will the costs of medical education fall? 
There are three predictable proposals for how the costs of residencies 
should be financed after cutting government spending on graduate medical 
education, each of which has shortcomings. 
A.  Require Teaching Hospitals to Absorb the Costs 
The direct and indirect costs of residency programs are too high for 
teaching hospitals to simply “absorb” or self-finance. Instead, asking 
hospitals to absorb these costs is more accurately described as asking 
teaching hospitals to increase the rates they charge to private payers for the 
care patients receive. 
As discussed earlier, hospital payment reforms and increased 
transparency will make it difficult for teaching hospitals to recoup medical 
education costs by charging higher rates to individuals and health plans. 
Instead, under this approach, the pressure on teaching hospitals to 
reduce or eliminate their residency programs will intensify, especially if 
federal GME or IME funding is cut in the amounts being discussed in 
Washington, D.C. 
B.  Require the Physician Residents to Finance the Residency Portion of 
Their Training through Their Tuition or Direct Payments to the Teaching 
Hospital 
Intuitively, many people jump to the following analysis: Physicians 
fall into high income brackets, therefore; Physicians have sufficient 
resources to repay medical education debt, therefore; Medical students 
should borrow to fund the cost of their education and then repay those loans 
during the high-income years that lie ahead. 
                                                 
52 See Dower, supra note 6 at 2. 
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While initially attractive in its simplicity, this analysis is not 
consistent with the practical realities faced by today’s medical students and 
practicing physicians. Physician residents already shoulder significant 
financial burdens as they enter graduate school from their previous 
education. Medical education debt is an increasing burden for tomorrow’s 
physicians. Moreover, the policy and patient care implications of medical 
debt, extend beyond the individual doctor’s financial realities of student 
loans. 
A recent study in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
found that medical residents carrying higher debt loads experienced higher 
rates of burnout.53 More concerning, however, is that the study showed that 
residents’ medical knowledge appeared to suffer when their education debt 
was more than $200,000.54 And, as one might expect, residents with both 
high education debt and emotional exhaustion performed even more poorly 
on medical knowledge tests.55 Although the study was inconclusive, its 
authors were troubled by the correlation of higher educational debt with 
emotional exhaustion and poorer performance on tests of medical knowledge 
during one’s residency.56 
Therefore, policy proposals that rely upon simply shifting residency 
and teach hospitals’ associated costs to the physician resident can be 
expected to generate several undermining consequences: 
 
(1) Discouraging some individuals from pursuing medical 
careers because of concerns about the subsequent debt 
obligations; 
(2) Prohibiting some of those who do complete their 
education and training from entering certain types of 
practice, such as primary care, or from practicing in certain 
areas of the country, such as rural communities, due to their 
need for higher incomes; 
(3) Reducing the resiliency and length of career of 
physicians with higher debt loads and earlier burn out; 
and/or 
(4) Potentially diminishing the quality and safety of care 
patients receive from those physicians stressed by financial 
debt and the corresponding emotional burnout. 
 
                                                 
53 See West, supra note 17, at 952; see also id. at 954 (noting that quality of life 
and satisfaction with work-life balance suffered with higher education debt amounts); see also 
id. at. 955 (noting that emotional exhaustion and depersonalization increased with higher 
education debt amounts). 
54 See id. at 955 (stating that residents’ performance on the Internal Medicine In-
Training Examination decreased by a statistically significant amount for those reporting debt 
exceeding $200,000). 
55 See id. at 959. 
56 See id. at 958. 
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C.  Require Medical Schools to Pay Teaching Hospitals for Providing 
Residency Training to Their Students 
Under this approach, it is reasonable to expect that medical schools 
would need to simply transfer this additional expense to students through 
higher tuition charges. Consequently, this approach suffers from the same 
hazards as the philosophy that expects physicians to borrow or self-finance 
their own residencies. 
IV.  PROPOSED PATH FORWARD 
Under new health care payment reforms that use measures of 
efficiency or costs of care to vary hospitals’ reimbursement amounts, 
supplemental GME and IME payments create significant problems for the 
long-term viability of residency and clinical programs. 
Even without addressing the different functions of the care delivery 
payment system and building a medical education financing structure that is 
separate from calculations of providers’ costs of care, it is clear that teaching 
hospitals will face increasing financial and market pressures to reduce or 
even eliminate their training programs. At a time when many commentators 
predict substantial shortages in caregivers, especially primary care 
physicians, restricting the number of training and residency slots available 
runs counter to the goal of meeting communities’ health care workforce 
needs. 
Furthermore, supplemental payment structures misalign incentives 
because a teaching hospital’s total medical education payments will fluctuate 
based on the number of Medicare or Medicaid patients it serves. This is 
particularly true for most state Medicaid programs because the federal 
government will not match state spending unless it is based on the volume of 
services teaching hospitals provide to Medicaid beneficiaries, not on other 
bases more closely aligned with graduate medical education, such as per 
resident allocation.57 As a result, teaching hospitals that serve populations 
with large numbers of Medicare or Medicaid enrollees may receive 
significant supplemental payments even though they may not have 
correspondingly large training or residency programs, and vice versa for 
teaching hospitals with large training programs in communities with 
proportionately smaller populations of public program enrollees. 
One potential risk to developing a new payment system is that it 
could make medical education funding more politically vulnerable to being 
cut. Today, such cuts are difficult for elected officials to support because 
imposing the cut essentially reduces Medicare or Medicaid payments, which 
                                                 
57 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(b) (2015). 
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seem threatening to voters worried about losing access to care or covered 
benefits. 
Therefore, any new financing systems need to be joined to policies 
or safeguards that establish long-term sustainability and predictability so 
teaching hospitals can appropriately plan ahead and make reliable 
commitments to the residents, nurses, pharmacists, and other professionals 
who agree to train in their facilities. 
A foundational objective for graduate medical education finance 
reform should be to detangle payments to reimburse providers for care 
delivered to patients from payments for educating and training the physicians 
and caregivers of the future. So long as GME payments to teaching hospitals 
are interwoven with payments to teaching hospitals for care delivery, it will 
be difficult for teaching hospitals to compete under new payment 
methodologies and consequences of price transparency activities. 
By detangling support for medical education activities from 
reimbursement for care delivery, it will be easier for payers—both public and 
private—to compare the performance of hospitals on more equal terms. 
Teaching hospitals would need to be able to deliver patient care for the same 
or lower costs than their competitors or suffer the market’s consequences. 
At the same time, because the financing of their residency programs 
would not depend on the kinds or volume of services they provide to 
particular patient populations, or face elimination because of a hospital’s 
need to reduce the appearance of having high-cost care delivery, teaching 
hospitals could have greater confidence in the sustainability of their 
residency programs. 
In order for such parallel financing systems to work, there will need 
to be a method for identifying and distinguishing which portion of a payment 
to a hospital is for patient care and which portion, if any, is for graduate 
medical education. 
State and federal regulatory restrictions should be adopted to 
preclude Medicare, Medicaid or any other public program, as well as 
commercial health plans, self-insured employers or other entities, such as 
those seeking greater price transparency, from including the GME portion of 
a hospital’s revenue in any calculation of the hospital’s total-cost-of-care, 
efficiency or other formula intended to compare or evaluate hospitals based 
on their care delivery. In other words, once the distinction between revenue 
from care delivery and revenue from medical education programs is clear, no 
one should be allowed to re-tangle the two for purposes of comparing one 
hospital’s cost of care to another’s. 
Of course, the current GME system does not offer the kind of 
precision in cost accounting necessary for establishing how much the public 
or private payers should pay to support teaching hospitals’ education and 
training programs. Therefore, a multi-stakeholder task force comprising 
representatives of teaching hospitals, public and private payers, and 
independent third party auditors, should attempt to track and calculate as-
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close-to-actual costs of GME programs as possible. Although no 
methodology or calculation will perfectly account for every variation 
between residency programs, establishing a more objective baseline will 
enable policymakers to adequately adjust existing expenditures to align with 
teaching hospitals’ costs. 
Once such a cost accounting methodology exists, there will no 
longer be a need for Medicare or Medicaid programs to distinguish between 
direct GME and IME payments, so these can collapsed together. Doing so 
will reduce administrative complexity while enhancing the kind of 
transparency need to clearly distinguish between payments for care and 
payments for education. Likewise, because a more precise measure of actual 
costs of GME activities will be available, the financing system should shift to 
calculating GME payments based on the number of residents trained, perhaps 
with adjustments to create incentives for increasing the number of physicians 
who will practice in shortage areas, rather than the number of Medicare or 
Medicaid beneficiaries treated. 
As noted earlier, once these payments are distinguishable from one 
another, it might be politically expedient for elected officials to cut spending 
on graduate medical education because they could point to their efforts to 
protect payments for care delivery from cuts. Not only does the threat of 
funding cuts jeopardize the financial sustainability of residency programs, 
the prospect of GME support becoming a fluctuating bobber rising and 
falling with year-to-year or election-to-election political or budgetary waves 
would erode teaching hospitals’ confidence in their financial wherewithal to 
extend what are often three- to seven-year commitments to physicians 
looking for residencies. 
Therefore, while detangling GME payments from care payments is 
necessary to allow teaching hospitals to survive under new payment 
methodologies and transparent environments, the GME payments should 
continue to flow through Medicare and Medicaid programs in a manner that 
prevents legislators or regulators from cutting GME without simultaneously 
cutting reimbursement rates for care delivery. 
Finally, policymakers will need to decide what portion of GME costs 
should be borne by privately insured populations. Because Medicare and 
Medicaid are funded through broad-based taxes. If GME programs were 
supported exclusively through these public programs the GME programs 
would arguably be supported by everyone. On the other hand, given 
estimates of current Medicare and Medicaid spending relative to teaching 
hospitals’ costs for residency programs, it seems unlikely that increasing 
those public programs’ expenditures to the levels necessary to fully finance 
GME will be practical. 
Instead, Congress should consider a “covered life assessment” that 
would be paid by commercial health plans, third party administrators of self-
insured employers’ plans, and Medicare Advantage and Medicaid-managed 
care organizations. The revenues from this assessment would be dedicated to 
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Medicare and used exclusively for the GME portion of teaching hospitals’ 
Medicare payments. Although such an assessment would face significant 
political pushback from business groups, advocates opposed to tax increases 
or government programs, and health plans, such a tax would better reflect the 
reality that everyone who accesses the health care system benefits from the 
medical education and training their caregivers received at the outset of their 
careers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
If left unchanged, current financing systems supporting teaching 
hospitals’ physician residency programs will begin to work against the 
teaching hospitals’ sustainability. Teaching hospitals struggle to compete 
against non-teaching hospitals with lower cost structures under new payment 
reforms, increased transparency, and the natural economically motivated 
decisions that accompany the increasing reliance on high deductible health 
plans and narrow provider networks. Teaching hospitals will be forced to 
decide between fulfilling their mission-driven commitment to educating and 
training the workforce of tomorrow at the risk of financial ruin or 
abandoning their residency programs to cut costs that allow them to compete 
head-to-head with hospitals unburdened by those costs. This impossible 
choice can and should be avoided. 
By detangling GME payments from reimbursements for care 
delivery, new payment models, price transparency initiatives, and health plan 
design innovations will progress in a fashion that evaluates hospitals solely 
on the costs of care delivery without confusing such analysis with costs 
associated with supporting GME programs. 
For such detangling to work for payers, teaching hospitals, 
policymakers and consumers, there must be guardrails that establish greater 
long-term certainty of financial support for GME programs, continued use of 
Medicare and Medicaid programs as the backbones for allocating GME 
support preferably on a per resident basis, and the implementation of a 
national covered lives assessment or similar broad based surcharge on 
commercial insurers, third party administrators and managed care 
organizations in public programs to ensure that GME programs are supported 
by all of those who benefit from the physicians and caregivers they train. 
 
